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Objective:  The  Canadian  province  of  British  Columbia  (BC)  is adding  ﬁnancial  incentives  to
increase  the  volume  of surgeries  provided  by  hospitals  using  a marginal  pricing  approach.
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to calculate  marginal  costs  of  surgeries  based  on assumptions
regarding  hospitals’  availability  of labor  and  equipment.
Data: This  study is based  on observational  clinical,  administrative  and  ﬁnancial  data  gener-
ated by hospitals.  Hospital  inpatient  and  outpatient  discharge  summaries  from  the  province
are linked  with  detailed  activity-based  costing  information,  stratiﬁed  by assigned  case  mix
categorizations.
Study  design:  To  reﬂect  a range  of  operating  constraints  governing  hospitals’  ability to
increase  their  volume  of  surgeries,  a number  of  scenarios  are  proposed.  Under  these  sce-
narios,  estimated  marginal  costs  are  calculated  and  compared  to prices  being  offered  as
incentives  to hospitals.
Principal ﬁndings:  Existing  data  can  be used  to  support  alternative  strategies  for  pricing
hospital  care.  Prices  for inpatient  surgeries  do  not  generate  positive  margins  under  a range
of operating  scenarios.  Hip  and  knee surgeries  generate  surpluses  for hospitals  even  under
the most  costly  labor  conditions  and are  expected  to generate  additional  volume.
Conclusions: In health  systems  that  wish  to ﬁne-tune  ﬁnancial  incentives,  setting  prices  that
create  incentives  for additional  volume  should  reﬂect  knowledge  of  hospitals’  underlying
cost  structures.  Possible  implications  of mis-pricing  include  no response  to the  incentives
or  uneven  increases  in supply.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Introduction
This study describes an approach to deriving estimates
f the marginal costs of surgical care. The study is moti-
ated by a payer’s need to understand the marginal costs
f hospital-based surgical care in order to design payment
trategies to incentivize hospitals to increase volumes of
lective surgeries. Little work has been done to date around
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estimating the marginal cost of hospitalizations [1–3] and,
based on an example from Canada, the ﬁndings are directly
relevant to healthcare systems contemplating alternative
strategies for pricing hospital care. The results provide
insight into differences between the estimated marginal
cost and prices and conclude with a discussion of the policy
implications regarding ﬁnancial incentives for increasing
the volume of surgical care.The methods used to fund hospitals have been a
contentious policy issue across Canada for many years.
Hospitals across Canada have been funded with global
budgets, or a single annual lump sum payment, for decades
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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[4] and have often been associated with delays in access to
elective care [5,6]. In spite of signiﬁcant increases in Cana-
dian hospital spending over the past decade, international
comparisons document the delays that Canadians experi-
ence in accessing care, including some of the longest wait
times for access to specialist and hospital care [7] with
hospital occupancy rates routinely exceeding 97% [8].
In 2010, the government of British Columbia (BC),
Canada’s westernmost province with a population of
approximately 4.5 million residents, implemented a series
of reforms aimed at achieving several policy objectives,
including limiting hospitals’ ability to cut services to meet
budgets, improving technical efﬁciency and increasing the
volume of surgical care. BC’s government created a new
body called the Health Services Purchasing Organization
(HSPO) [9]. Endowed with $250 million Canadian dollars
and a three-year mandate, the HSPO was tasked with exe-
cuting the government’s objectives. The umbrella term for
the funding policy reforms enacted by the HSPO is patient-
focused funding (PFF). One important element of PFF is
the Procedural Care Program (PCP). Under the PCP, the
HSPO purchases incremental volumes of hospital-based
surgeries beyond an existing threshold, remunerated on a
fee-for-case basis.
Healthcare is regionalized in BC, which means that
health services are organized, delivered and funded within
ﬁve geographically deﬁned regional Health Authorities
(HAs). A notable exception is that most surgeons are remu-
nerated on a fee-for-service basis directly from the BC
government, bypassing the HAs, hospitals and HSPO. Under
the PCP initiative, the HSPO contracts with individual HAs
for additional volumes of surgeries. The PCP provides a new
opportunity for hospitals to increase their revenues beyond
their global budgets by increasing the volume of surgeries
they perform. Not all surgeries are eligible for PCP funding;
the list includes only elective, or planned, surgeries, and
excludes all emergency surgeries and cancer-related sur-
geries. The HSPO determined which surgeries were to be
targeted with ﬁnancial incentives, discussed in more detail
below, though the process for arriving at its list has not
been published. Surgeries not targeted by the PCP program
are not eligible for the HSPO’s PCP funding.
The price that the HSPO pays for additional surgeries
is important; HAs are not obligated to enter into contracts
to increase their volume of surgical care. In many other
countries which fund hospitals prospectively using Diagno-
sis Related Group (DRG)-like systems, payers set the price
of hospital cases as the expected (average) cost of patients
of the same case mix  group. The expected cost is intended
to cover the direct costs of labor inputs, supplies and equip-
ment, but also some portion of hospital’s indirect costs, or
overhead, including equipment depreciation and amorti-
zation. The concept of paying the total expected cost for
additional surgical activity is problematic in BC because
hospitals’ existing global budgets are already expected to
include all of the aforementioned costs, creating the possi-
bility of double payment by the government for the same
activity.
The HSPO has chosen to deal with this issue by setting
prices for reimbursed procedures that are less than the full
expected cost of the procedures, stating that the funding19 (2015) 1111–1118
policy will support hospitals in making better use of their
marginal capacity [10]. These prices—currently derived at
$1520 and $3040 for each case mix-adjusted weighted
case performed on an inpatient and day surgery basis,
respectively—appear to be considerably lower than Cana-
dian hospitals’ overall national average cost per weighted
case [11]. However, since hospital’s cost functions are
unobservable by the HSPO, it is unclear how these prices
relate to hospitals’ marginal costs or hospitals’ potential for
improving cost efﬁciency.
Applying the concept of marginal cost to pricing is
attractive from the government’s perspective of increas-
ing volume: in theory, the government pays a price that
compensates hospitals for the incremental costs of the
additional procedures without paying twice for the same
indirect and overhead expenses. In setting the price, strik-
ing the appropriate balance becomes important: if the price
is set too low, hospitals will not cover their marginal costs
and will either not respond to the incentives, see their mar-
gins deteriorate if they do take on new procedures, or see
hospitals avoid high cost patients [12]. On the other hand,
if the price is set too high, hospitals would be expected
to respond to the incentives and surgical volumes will
increase. This outcome will meet the HSPO’s objective;
however, the increases in volume may  be unevenly focused
among a subset of hospitals whose marginal costs are less
than the marginal price and inadvertently exacerbate geo-
graphic inequities in access.
Such policy decisions have major impacts on patients’
access to hospital care and on health system costs, and
should be informed by evidence. The ﬁndings from this
study are important for supporting healthcare payers in
making pricing policy decisions; consequentially, they are
also of value for hospital administrators seeking to make
program and service planning decisions in response to
payers’ pricing strategies, conditional on their own oper-
ating circumstances.
2. Data
The analytic objective of this study is to estimate
marginal costs of hospital-based surgical care using
detailed retrospective observational data drawn from a
number of sources, including labor contracts which spec-
ify normal and overtime labor rates, hospital discharge
summaries, charts of accounts, and hospital patient-level
cost data. Two ﬁscal years of data, from April 1, 2008
through March 31, 2010, are used for the analysis. The
use of anonymous secondary data was approved by the
Behavioral Research Ethics Board (BREB) at the University
of British Columbia, Canada.
2.1. Financial data and chart of accounts
BC hospitals report detailed ﬁnancial and statistical data
assigned to standardized, and highly discriminate, depart-
mental categories known as Functional Centres (FC) [13].
Each FC is an operational subdivision within a hospital,
such as a clinical department, where revenue and expenses
associated with the FC activity are collected and reported.
Direct departments are those that provide patient-focused
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ervices and include inpatient (e.g., Orthopedic Ward, ICU)
nd outpatient nursing departments (e.g., Day Surgery
nit, Endoscopy), diagnostic departments (e.g., Labs,
iagnostic Imaging) and therapeutic departments (e.g.,
hysiotherapy, pharmacy). Support, or indirect, depart-
ents provide support and corporate level services rather
han patient-focused services and are often synonymous
ith the term overhead. Examples of these departments
nclude Human Resources, Materials Management, Infor-
ation Technology, Housekeeping, Finance/Accounting or
enior Management. Within each FC, labor, equipment and
upply costs are reported at a detailed level.
.2. Clinical data
Acute inpatient and day surgery discharge summaries
ocument surgeries that occurred during the hospitaliza-
ion, comorbidities, demographic details such as age and
ex of the patient, and administrative details such as dis-
harge location. This information is used to categorize each
atient record into a mutually exclusive case mix  group
14]. In BC, the Case Mix  Group (CMG+) algorithm is used
o categorize acute inpatient activity while and the Com-
rehensive Ambulatory Care Classiﬁcation System (CACS)
s used to categorize day surgery activity. Both case mix
ethodologies are maintained by the Canadian Institute
or Health Information [15].
Each case mix  group has an accompanying cost weight
hose value represents the expected cost of patients
ssigned to the same group, known as resource intensity
eights (RIW), and exclude physician fees. RIWs are esti-
ated annually using a sample of hospital patient-level
ost data from a number of different provinces, and whose
alues are not determined by the HSPO. The RIW values are
tandardized around a value of 1.0, representing the mean
ost of all cases in the sample. Adjustments are made to the
ssigned RIW for factors such as patient age, comorbidity
nd long stay outliers [16]. The RIWs for acute inpatient
nd day surgery are calculated on the same scale to facili-
ate comparisons of costs between hospital settings. Given
heir basis in hospitals’ data, RIWs can be interpreted both
s the relative costliness of treating each patient—and as
he revenue associated with the patient if the hospital were
emunerated on a per-case basis.
Under the PCP methodology, the price paid for an addi-
ional surgery is a product of two factors. The ﬁrst factor
s the cost weight (RIW) of the case mix  group to which
he case is assigned. The second factor is the base price
er weight set by the HSPO across all cases. The base
rice varies according to whether the surgery occurs in a
ay surgery or inpatient setting: currently, the base price
er weight set by the HSPO is $1520 for each inpatient
eighted case and $3040 for each day surgery weighted
ase. As an example, the price for a day surgery case with
 CACS RIW of 0.50 would be $3040 multiplied by 0.50, or
1520. The higher price per weight for day surgery relative
o inpatient surgery signals the HSPO’s emphasis on the
olicy objective of incentivizing additional volumes of day
urgery activity. While there is no published information
vailable providing insight into the process of how the base
rice per inpatient and day surgery weight were derived,19 (2015) 1111–1118 1113
the price for day surgeries is 80% of the assumed vari-
able cost of $3800 per case, while the inpatient weighted
case is 40% of $3800 [17]. For hospitals and the payer, the
uniform prices are insensitive to the characteristics of hos-
pitals associated with variation in hospitals’ costs [18] such
as size of hospital and economies of scale, teaching status
[19], input prices and efﬁciency [20].
A notable exception to the above methodology is the
payment model for hip and knee replacements. These sur-
geries had already been reimbursed for several years with
incremental funding by the BC and federal governments
[21]. In ﬁscal year 2011/2012, the HSPO began including
ﬁnancial incentives for hip and knee replacements too;
however, for hip and knee replacements, the price was
set at the rate of $5548 per weighted case, a rate much
higher than that paid for other inpatient procedures. The
two-tiered price offered by the HSPO for hip and knee
replacements opens the door to hospitals to differentially
respond to inpatient prices.
2.3. Activity-based costing data
A hospital uses inputs (such as labor, capital, mate-
rials and supplies) to produce healthcare services that
patients consume during their episode of care. These ser-
vices are often referred to as intermediate products and
might include an hour of nursing care or a CT scan. Busi-
ness rules governing derivation and allocation of the costs
of hospitals’ intermediate products are codiﬁed in activity-
based guidelines [22]. The output of activity-based costing
is the assignment of intermediate product costs to a patient
hospitalization. A broader sample of detailed costing infor-
mation is used to calculate cost weights for case mix  groups
[23,24].
Labor costs tend to be the biggest expense for hospitals.
Intermediate product costs for labor are based on either
actual or relative workload. In the former case, hour wages
and beneﬁt expenses of nurses are attributed to patients
based on nurses’ reported workload measures. In the lat-
ter case, departmental costs are allocated to patients on a
pro-rata basis; that is, the ratio of workload provided to the
patient and the total annual cost of the department. In this
study, nurses’ reported workload is the basis for attribut-
ing costs, which has been shown to provide more accurate
estimates of patient-level costs than relative workload [24].
Salaries of unit nurse managers, whose roles are primarily
administrative, are distributed to patients as direct costs
on the basis of the nursing workload of patients in the unit.
Expenditures on high cost supply items are directly
attributed to the patient and include drugs, artiﬁcial pros-
thetics, pacemakers and cardiac catheters. Costs of minor
supplies are attributed to the department and then allo-
cated to the patient based on nursing workload. Minor
supply items include sutures, staples, dressings, needles,
syringes and gloves.
Each intermediate product cost has both a variable and
ﬁxed component. The variable component is the cost that
varies directly with the volume of services provided. The
ﬁxed component represents the costs unassociated with
the volume of care provided in the short term. For example,
depreciation of imaging equipment is considered a ﬁxed
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cost while the labor costs of imaging technologists are vari-
able.
Many direct departments consume services from indi-
rect departments. The indirect departments allocate their
ﬁxed and variable costs to patient care departments as
overhead and then to individual patients. For example,
housekeeping costs are attributed to departments based
on their square footage, and attributed to patients based
on their lengths of stay.
2.4. Summary data
The sections above describe the framework and process
for allocating hospital costs to patients. The data are based
on acute inpatient and day surgery discharges from 16 large
community and teaching hospitals that collect activity-
based costing data. Small hospitals were not eligible for
the volume incentives of this program.
Each acute inpatient or day surgery discharge summary
is accompanied by a categorization of department-level
ﬁxed and variable costs and an associated case mix
group. For inpatient hospitalizations, there are 1,497,952
department-level cost records from 127,559 discharges.
For day surgeries, there are 806,101 department-level cost
records, representing 343,035 unique day surgeries. In the
data, labor costs represent, on average, 75% of acute inpa-
tient costs and 77% of day surgery costs, percentages which
include approximately 20% overhead.
3. Methods
From the hospital perspective, the marginal cost of
performing an additional surgery is based on the avail-
ability and cost of required inputs such as labor, supplies,
operating room time and equipment. Costs and supply of
these inputs can be expected to vary between individual
hospitals depending on their operating conditions, with
implications for estimating the marginal cost of a surgery:
for example, should nursing costs be considered at regular
hourly rates or at overtime rates? From the payer’s per-
spective, the status of these inputs at the hospital level is
typically unobserved; hence, payers wishing to set prices
approximating hospitals’ marginal cost will generally have
to rely on assumptions regarding these operating condi-
tions.
This analysis derives marginal cost estimates for a set
of high volume HSPO-funded elective surgeries under four
unique scenarios, each based on a different set of assump-
tions around a hospital’s operating conditions. Hospitals
contemplating the decision to take on additional funded
surgeries may  ﬁnd themselves in any one of these sce-
narios, and will need to compare the marginal revenues
available through additional cases with their marginal
costs of performing the new cases. Payers contemplating
the design of a pricing policy will need to carefully consider
how hospitals in different operating scenarios will respond
to the pricing approach.The scenarios presented here assume that overhead
costs remain constant; additional costs are not included
for indirect departments such as administration, human
resources and information technology. The scenarios also19 (2015) 1111–1118
assume the availability of excess facility space and equip-
ment required to perform the additional surgeries, ignore
standard requirements for purchasing labor inputs, such as
a minimum of a four-hour shift, and assume that per unit
supply and drug costs do not change with the addition of
one surgery. As the HSPO funding policy is intended to take
advantage of hospitals’ marginal capacity [10], the scenar-
ios do not include payment for large capital costs such as
facility construction and high cost equipment—expenses
that are reimbursed by the BC government using a project-
based approach. These are reasonable assumptions for this
analysis; however, these assumptions may  not reﬂect the
reality for hospitals who  may  be prevented from undertak-
ing large volumes of new cases due to a lack of available
space or equipment, or for hospitals who require addi-
tional investment in administrative expenses to manage
the growth in clinical programs. These implications are
discussed in the conclusion of this paper.
Of the four scenarios, scenario one is the most gener-
ous from the hospital perspective: it assumes that hospitals
have excess staff time available from nurses and other pro-
fessionals to dedicate to an additional procedure without
increasing labor costs. Hence, under this scenario, marginal
labor costs are zero and include only expenses for patient-
speciﬁc supplies and drugs.
Scenario two assumes that hospitals can accommodate
an additional surgery by being more time-efﬁcient with
current capacity and by supplying additional labor inputs,
without overtime. Nursing care, technologists and other
medical personnel are remunerated at their regular rate,
while marginal beneﬁt expenses are assumed to be zero.
As with scenario one, patient-speciﬁc supplies and drugs
are assumed to be variable.
Scenario three assumes that an additional surgery can
be performed only by supplying additional labor inputs
at overtime rates. In this scenario, nursing labor inputs
are remunerated at 1.5 times their regular rate. Beneﬁt
expenses are assumed to be 50% of regular beneﬁt expenses
to reﬂect that some portion of beneﬁt expenses are already
fully paid by the regular hours; sensitivity analysis of this
assumption, not shown, determined that the marginal costs
are not sensitive to moderate deviations from this assump-
tion. Once again, supply and drug costs are variable.
The ﬁnal scenario assumes that an additional surgery
will require labor inputs to be supplied at premium over-
time levels, at two  times their regular rate. Premium
overtime rates generally occur only after a period of
standard overtime rates. In this scenario, marginal beneﬁt
expenses fall to 30% since the majority of beneﬁt expenses
are assumed to have already been paid within regular
working hours and at 1.5 overtime rates. Supply and drug
costs are variable at constant unit rates. A summary of the
scenarios is provided in Table 1.
Scenarios three and four become increasingly realis-
tic if operating rooms that are regularly closed through
weekends and holidays are opened to provide additional
elective surgeries, with labor inputs reimbursed at a pre-
mium. These latter two  scenarios are included because
serious attempts at expanding the volume of surgical care
in BCs hospitals will involve maximizing the efﬁciency of
operating rooms by increasing their hours of utilization.
J.M. Sutherland / Health Policy 119 (2015) 1111–1118 1115
Table  1
Summary of scenarios used to derive marginal costs for surgeries eligible for supplemental revenue.
Compensation category Scenario Average cost
One Two Three Four
Nursing labor Zero Regular Overtime Premium overtime Included
Non-nursing labor Zero Regular Regular Regular Included
Patient-speciﬁc supplies Included Included Included Included Included
General supplies Included Included Included Included Included
Other  supply costs Included Included Included Included Included
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oOverhead ﬁxed costs Zero Zero 
Overhead variable costs Zero Zero 
The methods used here for calculating marginal costs
re based on linking each patient’s clinical information
nd case mix  group with patient-level costing information
eported at the departmental level based on anonymized
dentiﬁers. In this format, each patient’s costs, for all
epartments that provide care to a patient, are reported as
ariable and ﬁxed costs. Variable costs and the portion of
xed costs described in Appendix 1 are summed according
o the scenarios described above to calculate the marginal
ost for a single patient within each case mix  group.
ince the selected marginal case is arbitrary, the process
s repeated once for each patient within the same case
ix  group to reﬂect natural variability in the volume and
ntensity of services provided. Then, marginal costs for each
rocedure are derived as the average of the marginal costs
stimated from patients in the same case mix  group. The
stimated average marginal costs for each procedure are
ompared with the expected (average) cost and the HSPO
rice per case. It is possible that the actual price paid by
he HSPO may  differ slightly from those shown as the ﬁnal
rices have not been published.
While the scenarios and methods presented above can
e applied to all day surgery and acute inpatient case
ix  groups, the focus of this analysis is on surgeries for
hich the HSPO provided ﬁnancial incentives to the HAs to
ncrease volume through the PCP program. This list of sur-
eries includes cholecystectomy, hernia repair, shoulder
urgery, hand and wrist, sinus surgery, knee arthroscopy,
nd hip and knee replacements. Patients that die or are
ransferred between hospitals are excluded from the anal-
sis. For included surgeries, average lengths of stay are
hown in order to inform discussion regarding the plau-
ibility of the different scenarios.
. Results
The average and marginal costs of selected day surgeries
nder each of the four scenarios described are presented in
able 2. Comparison of the estimated costs between the
our scenarios reveals that hospitals’ marginal costs fall
elow their average costs in all cases under scenarios one,
wo and three, and for four out of the seven day surgery
rocedures under scenario four. These ﬁndings are not sur-
rising since all scenarios are designed to assume available
apacity and equipment.
Taking cholecystectomy as an example, Table 2 shows
hat the average cost of the procedure is $1776. In scenario
ne, the marginal cost of an additional cholecystectomyPartial Partial Included
Partial Partial Included
is 25% of the hospital’s average cost. If cholecystectomies’
marginal costs also include labor input costs as described
by scenario two, then the marginal costs of cholecystec-
tomies tend to be less than 70% of the surgery’s average
cost. If labor for cholecystectomies is remunerated at over-
time premium rates, such as described by scenarios three
and four, hospital costs increase, associated with nursing
inputs, but even then, marginal costs are only close to hos-
pitals’ average cost.
Table 2 also includes the price paid by the HSPO to
HAs for additional day surgery volume in Canadian dollars.
At the time of this study, one US dollar is roughly equal
to one Canadian dollar. As previously noted, the HSPO’s
policy remunerates case mix-adjusted day surgery activ-
ity at twice the price of the equivalent case mix-adjusted
inpatient activity, excluding hip and knee replacements.
Notwithstanding the day surgery ‘premium’, Table 2 shows
that the HSPO prices are signiﬁcantly below average cost
for each procedure.
When comparing the price with the marginal cost
scenarios for each procedure, the results show that the
HSPO price signiﬁcantly exceeds hospitals’ marginal costs
under scenario one (ﬁxed labor costs) for all seven day
procedure groups, approaching triple the marginal cost
for sinus interventions, hand/wrist/foot interventions and
knee interventions. Under scenario two, with additional
labor remunerated at standard rates, the HSPO price only
exceeds marginal cost for one procedure (sinus interven-
tions), with the cost of the other six procedures exceeding
the price. In scenarios three and four, with additional labor
inputs remunerated at overtime rates, marginal costs sig-
niﬁcantly exceed the HSPO prices paid for all procedures.
Table 3 shows the marginal cost for inpatient surger-
ies eligible for supplemental funding. Comparison of the
average and marginal costs for scenarios one, two  and
three reveals that hospitals’ marginal costs are far below
their average costs for the assumptions modeled in these
scenarios. Only under scenario four, with labor inputs
remunerated at twice their standard rates, do hospitals’
marginal costs approximately equal their average costs.
In Table 3, the price paid by the HSPO for inpatient
surgeries is shown. As previously described, the routine
prices for inpatient procedures—excluding hip and knee
replacements—are approximately half the prices paid for
the equivalent case mix-adjusted activity in a day surgery
setting. Under the most generous set of assumptions for
hospitals modeled in scenario one, the HSPO price exceeds
hospitals’ marginal cost only for procedures with relatively
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Table 2
Summary of marginal costs of day surgeries targeted with ﬁnancial incentives, showing average cost, HSPO price and marginal cost under each scenario.
Day surgery case mix title Volume weighted cost wt. Hospital average cost Marginal cost in Canadian $ HSPO price
Scenario
One Two Three Four
Sinus intervention 0.3334 $1826 $394 $1085 $1413 $1727 $1100
Non-complex hernia interv. 0.2840 $1556 $476 $1013 $1295 $1544 $900
Complex hernia intervention 0.2840 $1556 $479 $1027 $1321 $1575 $900
Cholecystectomy 0.3243 $1776 $458 $1115 $1446 $1744 $1000
Shoulder intervention 0.3685 $2019 $705 $1409 $1775 $2108 $1200
6 
4 Hand/wrist/foot intervention 0.2220 $121
Other  knee intervention,
excluding cruciate repair
0.2126 $116
low prosthesis costs: speciﬁcally, plastics, otolaryngology
and general surgery. Since the full costs of prostheses are
attributed to patients in all scenarios, marginal costs exceed
the price paid for inpatient procedures with more expen-
sive prostheses, such as shoulder replacements; nursing
consumes approximately 35% of direct costs of shoulder
replacements, excluding overhead, while nursing con-
sumes approximately 75% for simple hernias. For the more
costly assumptions around labor inputs modeled in sce-
narios two, three and four, marginal costs far exceed
the HSPO prices for all procedures. The cost differential
between cases with higher and lower costs of prosthe-
ses diminishes as the assumptions regarding the scarcity
of labor inputs changes from scenario one to scenario
four.
The results for hip and knee replacements are presented
separately in Table 3 to highlight the different pricing
approach paid to hospitals by the HSPO for these surger-
ies. The prices for hip and knee replacements are 102% of
hospitals’ average cost; under all four scenarios, hospitals
are expected to generate a positive margin by increasing
their volume of hip and knee replacement surgeries. This
would remain the case even if hospitals ran their operating
rooms on weekends and holidays and paid premium labor
rates to do so. This ﬁnding contrasts the HSPO’s sizable
Table 3
Summary of marginal costs of inpatient surgeries targeted with ﬁnancial incen
scenario.
Inpatient surgery case mix title Average length
of stay
Volume
weighted
cost wt.
H
a
c
Sinus intervention 1.2 0.4946 
Non-complex hernia repair 1.7 0.5523 
Complex hernia repair 3.0 0.8116 
Shoulder/rotator cuff intervention 1.3 0.6038 
Shoulder replacement 2.3 1.6145 
Hand  intervention 1.3 0.6253 
Repair/reconstruction of breast 2.7 1.4652 
Nose/nasal cartilage intervention 1.1 0.4239 
Hip  and knee replacements funded at higher payment rates
Unilateral hip replacement 4.2 1.7888 
Unilateral knee replacement 4.1 1.5941 
Bilateral hip/knee replacement 5.2 2.4851 
Revised hip replacement w/o infection 5.3 2.2209 
Revised hip replacement with infection 6.2 2.6613 
Revised knee replacement w/o infection 4.4 1.9949 
Revised knee replacement with infection 5.8 2.2976 $260 $744 $974 $1184 $700
$270 $733 $978 $1195 $700
ﬁnancial incentives for hip and knee replacements to the
very modest incentives for other inpatient surgeries.
5. Discussion
Many countries have adopted DRG-like systems to pay
for hospital care, either entirely or partially, to provide
incentives for cost-efﬁciency. Whether this is the optimal
approach is still unclear. Nonetheless, with persistently
long waits for elective surgery across Canada, a number of
provincial health care systems are eyeing mixing incentive-
based models with global budgets in order to try to increase
the volume of hospital-based surgical care. The price paid
to hospitals is one key to creating the proper incentive
structure.
Given that hospitals’ capacity for additional surgeries
is unobserved, the four scenarios modeled in this analy-
sis illustrate a range of operating conditions that different
hospitals may  face in considering whether to undertake
additional funded surgeries, and that payers face to gener-
ate the desired effect on surgical volumes. The ﬁrst scenario
supposes that a hospital has excess labor pre-paid and
sitting idle, ready to be deployed to provide additional sur-
geries. Under this scenario, competent managers would
do well to deploy excess resources to surgeries that are
tives, showing average cost, HSPO price and marginal cost under each
ospital
verage
ost
Marginal Cost in Canadian $ HSPO price
Scenario
One Two Three Four
$2709 $721 $1701 $2173 $2595 $800
$3026 $654 $1888 $2499 $3020 $900
$4446 $987 $2792 $3717 $4459 $1300
$3308 $655 $1895 $2550 $3067 $1000
$8845 $3388 $6165 $7598 $8703 $2500
$3426 $617 $2052 $2782 $3364 $1000
$8027 $2328 $5370 $6943 $8147 $2300
$2322 $432 $1435 $1957 $2394 $650
$9800 $3322 $6880 $8526 $9820 $10,000
$8734 $2708 $6035 $7599 $8813 $8900
$13,615 $5255 $9721 $11,940 $13,574 $13,800
$12,168 $3711 $8262 $10,306 $11,985 $12,400
$14,581 $3835 $9609 $12,044 $14,114 $14,800
$10,930 $3836 $7695 $9498 $10,908 $11,100
$12,588 $3688 $8535 $10,725 $12,437 $12,800
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roﬁtable and do not require high cost supplies, such as
ernia repair. Whether this scenario is plausible in a Cana-
ian health system is highly questionable, given the current
eality of high bed occupancy and lengthy wait lists for
lective surgery.
The second scenario may  also have limited widespread
pplicability given the reality of labor contracts that restrict
ospitals’ ability to purchase incremental labor resources
t regular rates or in increments of fewer than four hours.
he third and fourth scenarios are more likely to approx-
mate most hospitals’ operational capacities to conduct
dditional surgeries within available physical space, using
dditional labor inputs purchased at overtime labor rates
o exploit unused weekend and holiday operating room
apacity.
Hospital administrators and payers alike would do well
o closely consider the relationship between hospitals’
arginal costs and marginal revenues when undertaking
dditional surgical volumes under these different operat-
ng environments. Under the current HSPO pricing model,
nd assuming no change in efﬁciency, hospitals appear to
tand to gain positive margins from providing additional
ay surgeries only if they are operating under the con-
itions modeled in scenarios one and two. For inpatient
urgeries, outside of the more highly-paid hip and knee
eplacements, the potential ﬁnancial gains for hospitals are
ven slimmer: in the majority of procedures, positive mar-
ins will only exist for hospitals operating under the ﬁrst
cenario.
For the payer, setting the price for the surgeries is
ffected by uncertainty regarding hospital’s cost function.
etting prices at a high level, such as the average, may
nduce increased volume but may  not generate the sought
fter improvements in cost efﬁciency. Lower prices, such
s those indicated by scenarios one and two, will result
n inefﬁcient or high cost hospitals not responding to the
ncentives unless they believe that they can improve their
echnical efﬁciency or achieve economies of scale. Thus, for
he payer, identifying hospitals’ potential for reducing costs
ill be important to anticipating responses to prices.
Two important assumptions underlying this study
hould be recognized. The ﬁrst assumption is that hospi-
als have sufﬁcient information on their current operating
onditions and marginal cost structures to inform the
nalysis and decision-making process described above.
urrently, only a minority of Canadian hospitals possess
perational activity-based costing systems, and not all
f these hospitals make consistent use of these sys-
ems for supporting management decisions. If provincial
overnments are going to proceed further with adding
arginal pricing to global budgets, they should be encour-
ging, or providing incentives for, collection of activity-
ased costing data, a recommendation echoed elsewhere
25,26].
The second assumption is more fundamental in nature:
t assumes that hospital administrators act as rational eco-
omic actors, with an interest in maximizing marginal
evenues up to the point where they equal marginal
osts. This assumption may  be inherently ﬂawed given
he decades of near total reliance on global budgets for
unding hospitals across Canadian provinces. In the past,19 (2015) 1111–1118 1117
hospital administrators have rarely been faced with the
sort of cost and revenue management decisions routinely
considered by their counterparts in other jurisdictions
employing market-oriented DRG-based payments. Will the
PCP policy be unsuccessful at increasing volumes of surger-
ies if hospitals are fully aware that the prices they will be
paid are inadequate for most types of surgery? Perhaps;
however, given the paucity of new revenue opportunities
historically available to BC hospitals under global budget-
ing, administrators may  be motivated to seek opportunities
to increase their revenues, even with the consequence of
eroding their overall operating margins.
Payers considering funding policy initiatives based on
marginal pricing for additional cases should also closely
monitor these schemes for potential perverse conse-
quences. Hospitals have considerable latitude over how to
distribute their existing surgical capacity; they can choose
to reallocate surgical capacity from the types of cases that
are not funded based on a volume basis to the types of
cases that are eligible for the new funding policy, an effect
known as crowding out [27]. Consequently, the practice of
funding only selected surgical procedures within a hospi-
tal’s overall suite of surgical programs based on volume
may  jeopardize access and lengthen waitlists for surgeries
that do not generate additional revenues. It is also pos-
sible that, in order to generate more volume, hospitals
become aggressive in decreasing intensity of treatment
or shortening lengths of stays to the point of negatively
affecting quality; consequently, hospital quality should be
carefully monitored during the HSPOs marginal pricing
program.
Finally, for Canadian hospital administrators, it is
likely that hospital operating costs and revenues make
up only one facet of a more complex, multidimensional
decision-making framework. Other drivers of management
decisions around clinical programs include the consider-
able inﬂuence of physicians on the hospital staff, who are
largely reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis outside of the
hospital’s own ﬁnances and, hence, may  have their own
decision-making calculi. Hospital mission and reputation
considerations may  also play a key role in decision-making
outside of the ﬁnancial realm.
In 2013, the BC government assumed the responsibil-
ities the HSPO and its programs. Based on a dearth of
published material, it is unclear whether the HSPO’s PSP
program achieved its objectives of increasing surgical vol-
ume for any category of surgery before being phased out.
However, the marginal pricing strategy did focus govern-
ment’s and hospital’s attention on the difference between
costs and prices of hospital care—in a health system whose
globally funded hospitals are not accustomed to prices.
Providing ﬁnancial incentives for increasing hospital
surgical volume is viewed by some policy-makers as one
policy direction to alleviate wait time pressures across
Canada without having to embark on radical funding
reforms, such as giving up on global budgets. The pricing of
surgeries will play a key role in determining the response
of hospitals. Marginal cost, and the capacity constraints of
hospitals explored in a range of scenarios presented here
provides a starting point for considering the size of the
ﬁnancial incentive.
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